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PROTECTING CRIME VICTIMS IN FEDERAL APPELLATE
COURTS: THE NEED TO BROADLY CONSTRUE THE CRIME
VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT'S MANDAMUS PROVISION
PAUL G. CASSELLt
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Congress passed the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"
or "Act")' to dramatically reshape the federal criminal justice system and
ensure that crime victims are treated fairly in the criminal process. The
Act created a "broad and encompassing" victims' bill of rights,2 guaran-
teeing victims (among other things) the rights to notice of court hearings,
to attend those hearings, and to be heard at particular hearings, such as
plea and sentencing hearings. Congress intended for these rights to give
victims the opportunity to participate in criminal justice proceedings,
protect their interests, and shape the outcome of those proceedings.3
An important feature of the CVRA is its provisions allowing vic-
tims to enforce their rights not only in trial courts, but also in appellate
courts. Among the enforcement provisions is one guaranteeing a crime
victim expedited access to appellate review. The CVRA provides that if
the district court denies any relief sought by a crime victim, the victim
"may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus .... The court
of appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72
hours after the petition has been filed. ' 4 In enacting this provision, Con-
gress sought to give crime victims genuine rights at all stages in the
criminal justice process. As one of the CVRA's co-sponsors explained,
"[W]ithout the ability to enforce the [victims'] rights in the criminal trial
and appellate courts of this country any rights afforded are, at best, rhe-
toric."5
The CVRA's appellate review provision appeared to provide crime
victims the same sort of appellate protections as all other litigants-as
several courts of appeals have held in reviewing crime victims' petitions.
t Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law,
University of Utah. I thank Doug Beloof, Brigida Benitez, Meg Garvin, Rebecca Hyde, Steven
Joffee, P. Davis Oliver, Greg Skordas, Steve Twist, and Trish Cassell for help in preparing this
article.
1. Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 102(a), 118 Stat. 2260, 2261-62 (2004) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006)).
2. 150 CONG. REC. S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
3. Id. at S4263.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (d)(3).
5. 150 CONG. REC. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added).
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Unfortunately, in a recent decision the Tenth Circuit parted company
with those other circuits and eviscerated the appellate protections prom-
ised to crime victims. In In re Antrobus,6 the Tenth Circuit rejected care-
fully reasoned decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuits and held
that crime victims could only obtain appellate relief if they show that the
district court had made a "clear and indisputable" error.7 The Tenth Cir-
cuit believed that, when Congress used the term "mandamus" in the
CVRA, it meant to drastically restrict the ability of appellate courts to
give crime victims' relief.8 The Tenth Circuit's demanding standard
means that, as a practical matter, it will be very difficult (if not impossi-
ble) for many crime victims to overturn erroneous decisions of district
courts, particularly given that crime victims' rights law is a new and
evolving field in which "indisputable" errors may be hard to prove.
This Article critiques the Tenth Circuit's Antrobus decision, arguing
that the Second and Ninth Circuits got it right and the Tenth Circuit sim-
ply got it wrong. When victims of crime are denied relief in the district
court, they should receive the same sort of appellate protections as other
litigants. This increased protection is what the language of the CVRA
clearly provides and what Congress plainly intended.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the factual
background surrounding Antrobus. Kenny and Sue Antrobus lost a mo-
tion to have their daughter, Vanessa Quinn, recognized as a protected
"crime victim" under the CVRA. Thereafter, despite four separate trips
to the Tenth Circuit, they were unable to secure a meaningful review of
that decision or release of the government's evidence on the issue. The
difficulties Kenny and Sue Antrobus faced in securing appellate protec-
tion of their rights will usefully frame the question of how the CVRA
should be construed.
In Part II, the Article turns to the background leading up to Con-
gress's enactment of the CVRA. The CVRA arose out of Congress's
frustration with inadequate protection of crime victims' rights, in both
the trial and appellate courts. Congress designed the CVRA to give vic-
tims meaningful and enforceable rights-rights that were to be protected
throughout the federal court system.
Part I of the Article then discusses the merits of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's analysis in Antrobus. Contrary to the Circuit's position, the plain
language of the CVRA-requiring appellate courts to "take up and de-
cide" crime victims' petitions--does not mean that crime victims are
limited to discretionary mandamus review of their claims, but rather,
indicates that crime victims are entitled to ordinary appellate review.
6. 519 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2008).
7. Id. at 1130-3 1.
8. Id. at 1127-30.
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Congress did not merely import discretionary mandamus standards into
the CVRA, but instead, plainly changed those standards to forge an ef-
fective and mandatory appellate remedy for violations of victims' rights.
Moreover, the legislative history of the CVRA clearly demonstrates that
Congress wanted crime victims to have ordinary appellate review of their
claims. The CVRA's legislative history is replete with statements from
the legislation's sponsors that the law would require appellate courts to
"broadly defend" crime victims' rights and "remedy errors" of lower
courts. The Tenth Circuit's crabbed construction of the Act clashes di-
rectly with Congress's stated purposes.
The Article concludes by suggesting that the Tenth Circuit should,
at the next opportunity, reconsider its position en banc and follow the
prevailing view in the courts of appeals. If the Tenth Circuit will not,
then the Supreme Court should review the circuit split that the Tenth
Circuit's decision created, and side with those circuits that have given
crime victims the full measure of protection that Congress intended.
I. THE ANTROBUSES' QUEST TO GIVE A VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT
The Antrobuses' efforts to give a victim impact statement at the
sentencing of the man who sold the gun used to murder their daughter
produced long and complicated litigation. The history of the litigation is
worth recounting, however, because it shows both the importance of vic-
tims having effective appellate review of their claims and the difficulties
that have arisen in the Tenth Circuit in providing such review. Remarka-
bly, despite four different trips to the Tenth Circuit, the Antrobuses were
unable to have the circuit review a district court ruling against them.
A. The Issue: Was Vanessa Quinn a "Crime Victim" Protected by the
CVRA?
The underlying issue in the Antrobus litigation was whether Vanes-
sa Quinn was a protected "crime victim" pursuant to the CVRA. Mack-
enzie Hunter committed a crime in the summer of 2006, when he ille-
gally sold a handgun to Sulejman Talovic, a juvenile. 9 As Hunter well
knew, Talovic could not lawfully possess a handgun because he was a
juvenile. In fact, it appears Talovic asked Hunter to obtain the gun for
him because he (Talovic) was blocked from buying one. About six
months later, on February 12, 2007, Talovic entered the Trolley Square
Shopping Center in Salt Lake City, Utah. In the largest mass murder in
recent Utah history, 10 Talovic used the handgun and a 12-gauge shotgun
9. Id. at 1124.
10. To qualify "recent" is necessary, because the Mountain Meadows Massacre occurred in
Utah in 1857. See generally JUANITA BROOKS, THE MOUNTAIN MEADOWS MASSACRE 69 (Univ. of
Okla. Press 1991) (1950); RONALD W. WALKER ET AL., MASSACRE AT MOUNTAIN MEADOWS
(2008). The massacre left 120 persons dead, and was probably the largest mass murder in United
States history until the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001.
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to kill five people and seriously injure four others. A bullet from the
handgun Hunter had illegally sold to Talovic killed Vanessa Quinn,
daughter of Kenny and Sue Antrobus."
On May 16, 2007, a federal grand jury returned a two-count felony
indictment against Hunter: Count I charged him with being a drug user in
possession of a firearm, 2 and Count H charged him with unlawful trans-
fer of a firearm to a juvenile with knowledge or reason to know that it
would be used in a violent crime.1 3 Plea negotiations ensued, and on No-
vember 5, 2007, Hunter entered guilty pleas pursuant to a plea agree-
ment. Hunter pled guilty to Count I (drug user in possession of a firearm)
and a newly filed misdemeanor criminal charge, alleging unlawful trans-
fer of a firearm to a juvenile (without any allegation about knowledge
that the gun would be used in a crime of violence).14 Under the plea
agreement, the Justice Department agreed to move to dismiss the original
Count H at the time of sentencing. After entry of the pleas, the district
court set sentencing for January 14, 2008.
About a month later, on December 13, 2007, having secured pro
bono legal counsel, 5 the Antrobuses filed a motion requesting that the
district court recognize their daughter, Vanessa Quinn, as a "crime vic-
tim" and the Antrobuses as her representatives under the CVRA.' 6 Their
motion noted that the indictment charged Hunter with illegal sale of a
firearm with knowledge that it would be used to commit a crime of vio-
lence. The motion further alleged that, based on an article in the Salt
Lake Tribune newspaper, Talovic told Hunter that he wanted the hand-
gun to rob a bank. Based on the indictment and the bank robbery discus-
sion, the Antrobuses asked that their daughter be recognized as a "crime
victim" under the CVRA.
The CVRA defines a "crime victim" as "a person directly and prox-
imately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense."' 17 The
Antrobuses argued that there could be no doubt that Vanessa was "di-
rectly" harmed when a bullet from the gun Hunter illegally sold to Ta-
lovic killed her. The Antrobuses also argued it was clear that this harm
was "proximately" caused by Hunter's crime. Not only did Hunter make
I1. United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2008 WL 53125, at *1 (D. Utah Jan. 3,
2008); Petition for a Writ of Mandamus Regarding Discovery Issues Pursuant to the Crime Victims'
Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (d)(3), at 5, In reAntrobus, No. 08-4013 (10th Cir. Jan. 25, 2008).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2006).
13. See id. §§ 922(x)(I )(A), 924(a)(6)(B)(ii).
14. See id. §§ 922(x)(I), 924(a)(6)(B)(i).
15. In the interests of full disclosure, I served as lead counsel for the Antrobuses' legal team
in the litigation described in this article.
16. Memorandum in Support of Sue and Ken Antrobus' Motion to Have Vanessa Quinn
Recognized as a Crime Victim, to be Recognized as Her Representative, to Make an In-Court Victim
Impact Statement, and to Receive Restitution at 2-3, United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK,
2008 WL 53125 (D. Utah Jan. 3, 2008).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (e) (2006) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 87:3
PROTECTING CRIME VICTIMS
his illegal sale directly to Talovic, but he specifically foresaw Talovic
using the gun to commit a violent crime. That the foreseen crime was a
bank robbery, rather than a mass murder, was of no consequence. The
Antrobuses explained that the tragic death of Vanessa Quinn (among
others) was precisely what Congress intended to prevent by prohibiting
illegal trafficking of guns. The Antrobuses, therefore, urged the district
court to recognize Vanessa as a "victim" of the defendant's crime under
the CVRA. As her representatives under the CVRA, 18 they sought to
deliver a victim impact statement at sentencing, receive restitution for
unreimbursed funeral expenses, and express their objections to the dis-
missal of Count H. Neither Hunter nor the United States filed objections
to these motions.
Nonetheless, on January 3, 2008, the district court denied the An-
trobuses' CVRA motion, holding that Hunter's crime was "too factually
and temporally attenuated" from the death of Vanessa Quinn to recog-
nize her as a "victim" of the crime. 19 The district court acknowledged
that the Antrobuses had referred to a discussion between Hunter and Ta-
lovic about a bank robbery, but deemed this statement "general specula-
tion." 20 "This type of speculation," the court concluded, "does not dem-
onstrate the type of knowledge or foreseeability necessary to finding
Hunter's sale of the firearm to a minor to be the proximate cause of
Quinn's death.",2' Accordingly, the district court held that Vanessa Quinn
was not a "victim" of Hunter's illegal sale of the handgun used to murder
her and, therefore, that Vanessa had no rights under the CVRA for the
Antrobuses to assert. The district court also denied the Antrobuses' mo-
tion to gain access to information (including an ATF Report) about what
Hunter and Talovic had discussed during the sale of the gun.
In one last rebuff of the Antrobuses, the district court further de-
clined to exercise its discretion at sentencing to briefly hear the Antro-
buses for even a few minutes. The Antrobuses made the alternative ar-
gument that, even if their daughter did not technically fall within the
protections of the CVRA, the district court should nonetheless allow
them to present a brief victim impact statement at sentencing.22 The dis-
trict court, however, while conceding it had authority to hear from the
Antrobuses about the murder of their daughter, declined to use its discre-
18. For deceased victims, the CVRA allows a "representative" to assert the victim's rights.
See id. § 3771 (b)(2)(D).
19. Hunter, 2008 WL 53125, at *4.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *5.
22. The reasons why the Antrobuses wanted to give a victim impact statement are discussed
in Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611, 617-18
(2009).
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tionary authority to hear from them because it had "an adequate under-
standing" of their views.
23
B. The Tenth Circuit Erects a Barrier to Review of Victims' Claims that
Fall Short of a "Clear and Indisputable" Error
Having been stymied by the district court, the Antrobuses sought
appellate review of the "crime victim" decision by the district court.
They did so by filing a writ of mandamus, the procedural device spelled
out in the CVRA. 24 Once again, the Justice Department did not object to
the Antrobuses' petition. Defendant Hunter objected, but only on the
ground that the Antrobuses' factual representations below were not suffi-
ciently substantiated.25
The Tenth Circuit denied the Antrobuses' petition. 26 The court be-
gan by stating that it would not follow decisions from the Second and
Ninth Circuits, which held that a CVRA mandamus petition provides
crime victims with ordinary appellate review. Instead, the court held
that the Antrobuses would have to meet a very demanding standard of
showing "that their right to the writ is 'clear and indisputable."'' 28 The
court reasoned that Congress had only authorized crime victims to file a
"writ of mandamus," thereby importing with that phrase "traditional
mandamus standards" that permit relief "only in extraordinary situa-
tions., 29 Even proceeding on that basis, the court conceded that the case
was a "difficult" one. 30 Nonetheless, the court could not "say that the
Antrobuses' right to the writ is clear and indisputable," 3' because it was
not "clear and indisputable" that Vanessa Quinn was a foreseeable victim
of Hunter's criminal firearms sale.32
The majority opinion for the court noted that "[o]ne might question
whether, with additional discovery, the Antrobuses might have been able
to determine whether, in fact, Mr. Hunter knew about Talovic's inten-
tions and what such knowledge might mean for the foreseeability to Mr.
Hunter of Talovic's crimes." 33 The concurring opinion from Judge Tym-
23. Hunter, 2008 WL 53125, at *6.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (d)(3) (2006).
25. See Mackenzie Glade Hunter's Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Regarding
Discovery Issues Pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) at 2-3, In re
Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-4013).
26. Antrobus, 519 F.3d at 1126.
27. Id. at 1124 (citing Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 101l, 1017
(9th Cir. 2006); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005)).
28. Id. at 1124 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (per
curiam)).
29. Id. at 1124-25 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allied Chem. Corp., 449 U.S.
at 34-35).
30. Id. at 1125.
31. Id. at 1126 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allied Chem. Corp., 449 U.S. at
35).
32. Seeid. at1125n.l, 1126.
33. Id. at 1125 n.1.
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kovich went even further, adding: "In my view, the district court and the
government erred in failing to permit the Antrobuses reasonable access
to evidence which could support their claim." 34 The court, however, de-
clined to address the discovery issues, finding that those issues were not
raised in the immediate proceeding.
On January 25, 2008, the Antrobuses filed a petition for panel re-
hearing with suggestion of rehearing en banc. On March 14, 2008, the
panel denied the petition, adhering to the "clear and indisputable" stan-
dard for conventional mandamus review. 35 In doing so, the panel added
additional explanation for its holding. The panel began by stating that the
term "[miandamus is a well worn term of art in our common law tradi-
tion., 36 The panel then reasoned that:
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor-
rowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise in-
structed.
37
In view of the fact that the conventional standard of review for
mandamus petitions is "clear and disputable" error, the panel concluded
that the same standard of review was appropriate for CVRA petitions.
The panel also decided that it had properly applied the standard in reject-
ing the Antrobuses' petition. Accordingly, the panel declined to grant a
rehearing. The panel also rejected the Antrobuses motion to consolidate
the mandamus petition with a parallel appeal that the Antrobuses had
filed (discussed in the next section). 38 The petition for rehearing en banc
was denied at the same time.
C. The Sentencing of Hunter and the Antrobuses' Efforts to Obtain In-
formation About Plans for a Bank Robbery
While their petition for rehearing was pending with the Tenth Cir-
cuit, the Antrobuses renewed their efforts in the district court to obtain
proof of the bank robbery discussion between Hunter and Talovic. On
the morning set for sentencing, January 14, 2008, the Antrobuses filed a
motion for reconsideration of the district court's earlier denial of their
motion for production of the ATF Report. On that afternoon, however,
the district court denied their motion in a written order, on the basis that
34. Id. at 1126 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
35. See id. at 1130.
36. Id. at 1127.
37. Id. at 1127-28 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)).
38. See infra note 70.
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the Justice Department had already certified that it had no such informa-
tion. The district court stated:
The government previously informed the court that it did not possess
any information relevant to Hunter's forseeability of Talovic's sub-
sequent crime. There remains no basis for this court to question the
government's position, and this court will not entertain repeated mo-
tions on the same issues, when the effect of those motions [is to] de-
lay a sentencing that is set to proceed.
39
Later that afternoon, having concluded that the Justice Department
possessed no information "relevant" to Hunter foreseeing any crime
committed by Talovic, the district court held a sentencing hearing for
Hunter. At the hearing, counsel for the Antrobuses first requested that the
Justice Department clarify whether the district court's written order was
correct in stating that the Department "did not possess any information
relevant to Hunter's foreseeability" of misuse of the gun in any violent
crime-not just the Trolley Square massacre.40 The following exchange
ensued:
Antrobuses' counsel: "The sentence in the Court's order seems to
suggest that the government has indicated it has no information re-
garding the use of the gun in any subsequent crime of violence. If
that's correct, we need to know that. If it's not-"
Court: "That's my understanding. That's my understanding. Do you
want to say anything about that or not?"
Assistant United States Attorney: "Judge, I'd rather not. I think we
have built a record. We have made representations."
Court: "The record is the record."
4'
The court then adhered to its position. Thus, based on its under-
standing that the Justice Department had no information that Hunter
knew that Talovic would use the gun in any subsequent violent crime,
the district court rejected the Antrobuses' efforts to have Vanessa Quinn
recognized as a "victim" of Hunter's crime under the CVRA. The district
court then proceeded to sentence Hunter without giving the Antrobuses a
chance to make a victim impact statement, as would be their right had
Vanessa been a "victim" under the CVRA.
On January 25, 2008, the Antrobuses filed a mandamus petition
with the Tenth Circuit to compel the Justice Department to turn over
documents, including the ATF Report, that would prove Talovic and
39. United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2008 WL 153798, at *1 (D. Utah Jan. 14,
2008).
40. Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings at 5, Hunter, 2008 WL 153798.
41. Id. at 5-6.
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Hunter had discussed a bank robbery. After ordering responses, the
Tenth Circuit denied the petition-again noting that it had previously
established a demanding standard of "clear and indisputable" error re-
view.42 The basis for the denial appeared to be that the Department had
promised to file relevant portions of the ATF Report under seal with the
district court and would have no objection to release of the document to
the Antrobuses, thereby rendering the Antrobuses' mandamus petition
moot.
43
Back in the district court, on February 7, 2008, the Justice Depart-
ment gave notice that it had "filed" the ATF Report under seal.44 The
next day, the Antrobuses filed an unopposed motion for release of the
redacted ATF Report with the district court. Remarkably, however, even
without opposition, on March 17, 2008, the district court tersely denied
the motion. The district court stated that although the motion was unop-
posed, it had not been stipulated to by the Government. The court further
stated: "While the court recognizes that it may have discretion to disclose
the ATF Report, the court is unwilling to create such a precedent to indi-
viduals who are attempting to establish their status as victims of a given
offense. 45
On March 28, 2008, the Antrobuses filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion of the district court's denial of their unopposed motion for release of
the ATF Report. The Antrobuses contended that because the Justice De-
partment had filed the documents under seal, it was obligated to provide
"good cause" for the sealing under the court's local rules, which strictly
limit what documents can be filed under seal.46 The Antrobuses further
argued that release of the document was required to correct the record in
the case because the district court had previously ruled based on the be-
lief that the Justice Department had no information in its files regarding a
bank robbery discussion between Talovic and Hunter, when in fact there
had been such a discussion-a fact that the Justice Department well
knew.
On April 21, 2008, the district court denied the motion for reconsid-
eration. The court stated briefly that the Government "did not file the
documents" but merely provided them for in camera review.47 Accord-
ingly, the requirements of the local rules were "inapplicable" and nothing
42. In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, slip op. at 3, 10 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008).
43. Id. at 9 n.2.
44. Notice of Sealed Documents Submitted for in Camera Review, United States v. Hunter,
No. 2:07CR307DAK (D. Utah Feb. 7, 2008). The Report was actually submitted for in camera
review. See infra note 49.
45. United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, slip op. at 2 (D. Utah Mar. 17, 2008).
46. D. UTAH CIv. R. 49-2(b).
47. United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, slip op. at 1 (D. Utah Apr. 21, 2008).
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in the Antrobuses' motion persuaded the court to alter its previous rul-
ing.
48
D. The Antrobuses' Unsuccessful Parallel Appeal
Meanwhile, the Antrobuses continued to press for appellate vindica-
tion of their right to give a victim impact statement by a separate proce-
dural vehicle-an appeal to the Tenth Circuit of the district court's deci-
sion denying their motion to be recognized as the victim's representa-
tives. After the Antrobuses' timely notice of appeal, the Justice Depart-
ment filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit
ordered full briefing on the jurisdictional question and the merits, and the
Antrobuses filed their opening brief on May 29, 2008. Two months later,
the Justice Department filed its response brief.49 For the first time, the
Justice Department admitted, in a public record, that Talovic had told
Hunter while the sale was being negotiated that he wanted the gun to rob
a bank. The Justice Department's Statement of the Facts recounted that
"Hunter asked Talovic why he wanted a gun, and Talovic said something
to the effect that he wanted a gun to use to rob a bank."50 The underlying
basis for that particular recounting of the facts was apparently the ATF
Report the Antrobuses had long been seeking, as that specific recitation
of the facts did not appear anywhere else in the public record of the case.
Curiously, the Justice Department did not include a citation for that sen-
tence in its brief, in contrast to other parts of its statement of facts, and
declined to provide the Antrobuses' counsel with any further information
about the source of the statement.
Simultaneously with filing its brief in the Tenth Circuit, the Justice
Department filed a motion to lodge the ATF report under seal, attaching
the ATF Report. 5' The motion stated that the Justice Department was
lodging the ATF Report with the Tenth Circuit "in the interest of com-
pleteness. 'S The Antrobuses promptly filed an objection to the filing of
a sealed document, noting that the Justice Department had failed "to pro-
48. Id. In arguing that the documents had been "filed" with the District Court, the Antrobuses
had been relying on a statement made by the Justice Department describing its submission. Yet, on
May 30, 2008, after the time for challenging the District Court's ruling in the Tenth Circuit had
expired, the Justice Department belatedly filed an "amended notice" regarding the sealed documents.
This notice stated that the Government had "inadvertently used the word 'filed' to describe submis-
sion of documents for in camera review." Amended Notice of Sealed Documents Submitted for in
Camera Review at I, United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK (D. Utah May 30, 2008).
49. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (10th Cir. 2008)
(No. 08-4010).
50. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
51. Motion for Leave to Lodge Under Seal For ex Parte in Camera Review Non-Recorded
Documents Submitted to the District Court ex Parte and Under Seal for Its in Camera Review at 1-2,
Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (No. 08-4010).
52. Id. at 2. The Justice Department did not disclose that the Antrobuses, through counsel, had
been strenuously urging the Department to release the ATF Report as part of its ethical obligation of
candor to the court.
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vide any justification for [the] sealing. 5 3 The Justice Department filed a
reply to this objection, stating that until the Tenth Circuit determined that
it had jurisdiction, it could not act on the Antrobuses' objection.54 In any
event, the Justice Department argued that the Privacy Act provided a
basis for sealing the document 55-apparently concluding that the privacy
interests of a deceased mass murderer came ahead of the Antrobuses'
interests in learning everything they could about how their daughter was
killed.56
On September 2, 2008, the Antrobuses filed a motion for remand in
light of newly revealed evidence in the government's files. 57 The Antro-
buses explained that the Government's admission in its response brief
was the first public disclosure of the bank robbery conversation between
Talovic and Hunter. Because this critical and potentially dispositive fact
had been previously concealed, the Antrobuses argued, a remand to per-
mit the district court to consider the evidence was appropriate.
Following oral argument, on December 2, 2008, the Tenth Circuit
dismissed the Antrobuses' appeal.58 The court concluded that "neither
our case law nor the CVRA provide for non-parties like the Antrobuses
to bring a post-judgment direct appeal in a criminal case." 59 The court
noted that the CVRA provides for mandamus review of denials of crime
victims' rights, but does not explicitly provide crime victims a right to
appeal. Based on this fact, the court reasoned "[t]hat the [fact the] CVRA
does not provide for victim appeals is consistent with the well-
established precept that 'only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly
become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment." ' 60 The court ac-
knowledged that the Antrobuses had cited a series of cases in which var-
ious circuits (including the Tenth Circuit itself) had allowed non-parties
to take appeals, including appeals in criminal cases. The court found
those cases unpersuasive, stating, "There is a common thread in those
criminal cases in which courts have permitted non-party appeals: the
53. Appellants' Objection to Government's Motion to Seal ATF Report and Motion to Recon-
sider Provisional Granting of the Motion to Seal at 2, Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (No. 08-4010).
54. Government's Reply in Support of August 1, 2008 Motion to Lodge ATF Report ex Parte
and Under Seal and Opposition to Appellants' August 13, 2008 Motion to Reconsider Order Provi-
sionally Granting Motion to Lodge ATF Report ex Parte and Under Seal at 9, Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308
(No. 08-4010).
55. Id. at 5-7.
56. As something of an additional fallback position, however, the Justice Department stated if
the Court found that it had jurisdiction and if the issue of whether Hunter could foresee Vanessa's
death was not a pure issue of law and if the disclosure of the Report would facilitate the resolution of
the foreseeability question, the Government would "defer to the Court's judgment about the propri-
ety of issuing an order (consistent with Privacy Act Exemption 11 [excluding documents disclosed
pursuant to a court order]) disclosing the pertinent portions of the Report to the Antrobuses' counsel,
subject to an appropriate protective order." Id. at 15.
57. See Appellants' Motion for Remand in Light of Newly-Revealed Evidence in the Gov-
ernment's Files, Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (No. 08-4010).
58. Hunter, 548 F.3d at 1317.
59. Id. at 1316.
60. Id. at 1311 (quoting Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988)).
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appeals all related to specific trial issues and did not disturb a final
judgment. ' 61 The court did not explain why the Antrobuses' challenge to
the "victim" ruling was a specific issue apart from the final judgment.
Nor did it explain why it would not reach a final conclusion on that issue,
which would affect issues apart from the final judgment in the case (such
as whether the Antrobuses would receive notice of any parole or other
release for Hunter at some later point in time). The court also relied on
the fact that the Antrobuses could seek mandamus review as a basis for
rejecting their appeal. "To hold otherwise," the court reasoned, "would
effectively grant victims two opportunities to appeal 62-although, in its
earlier ruling, it took great pains to emphasize that it was not giving the
Antrobuses the equivalent of an ordinary appeal.
The court then turned to the Antrobuses' motion for remand for re-
hearing in light of the newly-revealed evidence and the Government's
motion to seal the ATF report. On the remand motion, the Tenth Circuit
declined to reach the merits "because at this stage a motion for a rehear-
ing should be filed in the district court."63 The court noted that it was
proper for the Antrobuses to have first sought a remand in the Court of
Appeals. "But now that the appeal is no longer pending, the district court
is free to grant the relief the Antrobuses seek, and therefore the district
court is the proper venue for the motion for a new hearing." 64 The Circuit
concluded that "[b]ecause we are now dismissing the Antrobuses' ap-
peal, they can -and should-file their motion for a new hearing in light
of newly discovered evidence in the district court."
65
E. The Antrobuses' Final Attempt to Secure a Hearing in Light of the
Justice Department's Newly-Revealed Evidence
Following the Tenth Circuit's direct suggestion, the Antrobuses re-
turned to the district court and filed a motion for a new hearing. The An-
trobuses explained to the district court that the Justice Department's new-
ly-revealed information placed the initial ruling-that Hunter could not
foresee the use of the gun in a violent crime-in an entirely new light.
Once again, however, the Antrobuses were rebuffed by the district court.
On February 10, 2009, in a brief order, the district court denied the
Antrobuses' motion for a new hearing. 66 The district court assumed that
it had the authority to grant the motion but declined to do so for two rea-
sons. First, the district court concluded that "the reference in the gov-
ernment's brief to the conversation between Hunter and Talovic does not
61. Id. at 1314.
62. Id. at 1315 n.5.
63. Id. at 1316.
64. Id. at 1317 n.8.
65. Id. at 1316-17 (emphasis added).
66. United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90822, at *4 (D.
Utah Feb. 10, 2009).
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constitute newly revealed evidence. 67 Second, the district court con-
cluded that its ruling a year earlier denying the Antrobuses unopposed
motion for release of the ATF Report constituted a ruling on the merits
of whether the report would change its conclusion. 68 The district court
did not explain why its earlier ruling did not even mention (much less
discuss) the merits of this issue. Nor did the district court explain how it
was fair to the Antrobuses to have ruled a year earlier on the merits of a
claim that had not been presented by the parties and on which they had
not been heard. Nor did the district court explain how it could have pos-
sibly had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the Antrobuses' claim, as
the matter was on appeal to the Tenth Circuit at that time, thereby strip-
ping the district court of the ability to rule on the matter.
69
On February 20, 2009, the Antrobuses filed another mandamus peti-
tion with the Tenth Circuit challenging the district court's ruling. In their
fourth trip to the Tenth Circuit in just over a year, the Antrobuses ex-
plained that the Justice Department's newly revealed evidence placed the
central issue of whether Hunter could foresee his gun being used in a
crime of violence before the court. The new evidence showed that Hunter
was not "surmis[ing] that Talovic might" rob a bank, as the district court
had initially ruled, 70 but rather was told directly by Talovic that this was
his plan for the gun during the course of Hunter's sale. The Antrobuses
also argued, in the alternative, that if the Tenth Circuit was unable to
conclude that any district court error was clear and indisputable, then
they objected to being forced to satisfy that demanding standard of re-
view. They therefore asserted an objection to this standard to preserve
their right to seek further review of the issue.
The Tenth Circuit, however, appeared to want to close the case once
and for all, and rebuffed all the Antrobuses' efforts. The court began by
reaffirming its "clear and indisputable error" standard of review for man-
damus petitions. 71 Moreover, the court gratuitously preempted the An-
trobuses' effort to preserve the issue for review in the Supreme Court.
The court first noted that the holding was now the "law of the case" be-
cause the Antrobuses had not sought certiorari to review the issue ear-
lier.72 The court did not acknowledge that it had effectively prevented the
Antrobuses from seeking Supreme Court review earlier by denying their
67. Id. at *3.
68. See id. at *3-4.
69. While the Antrobuses appeal of the district court's denial of their motion to have their
daughter recognized as a "victim" stripped the district court of jurisdiction to reach the merits of that
claim, it did not strip the district court of jurisdiction to rule on their unopposed discovery motion to
release the ATF report to them-a matter that the Tenth Circuit had essentially sent back to the
district court when it denied the Antrobuses' second mandamus petition. See In re Antrobus, 519
F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 2008).
70. See United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2008 WL 53125, at *5 (D. Utah Jan. 3,
2008).
71. In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).
72. Id.
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motion to consolidate their parallel appeal with the mandamus petition.
73
The Circuit also stated, in dicta, that it would reach the same conclusion
on the petition under either standard of review.
Turning to the merits of the Antrobuses' arguments, the Tenth Cir-
cuit did not repeat-or even acknowledge-its earlier statement that the
Antrobuses "should" pursue the issue of discovery in the district court.
Instead, the court stated that the Antrobuses had failed to articulate a
specific legal standard that the district court failed to properly apply.74
Even if they had provided such a standard, the court continued, the An-
trobuses failed to show that the information about the bank robbery was
"newly discovered." The Circuit stated: "The difficulty is that the Antro-
buses have not demonstrated that they were unable to present evidence
along these very same lines over a year ago, when this litigation be-
gan. 75 Without recounting all of the litigation that the Antrobuses had
pursued in an attempt to obtain the ATF Report, the court stated: "Had
they made a record showing diligent but stymied efforts on this front, we
,,76might have a different case.
To put the final nail in the coffin, the Tenth Circuit then went on to
hold that the Antrobuses did not have any important new evidence. The
court stated: "Most generously, then, the Antrobuses' 'new evidence'
demonstrates only that Hunter knew-rather than just 'surmised' that
Talovic intended to rob a bank. But that is not so substantial a difference
as the Antrobuses insist.
77
At this point, then, the Antrobuses' litigation efforts came to an end.
To add one last insult to injury, however, the Justice Department (which
for more than a year had steadfastly refused to turn over the ATF docu-
ments to the Antrobuses because of the Privacy Act and other purported
impediments), decided to act on a long-pending Freedom of Information
Act request from the Salt Lake Tribune for the same documents. The
Justice Department released the documents, which lead to a newspaper
article headlined "Notes Confirm Suspicions of Trolley Square Victim's
Family. '78 The article explained:
73. See In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27527, at *13 (1Oth Cir. Feb. 1,
2008). Because the mandamus petition and appeal were not consolidated, any petition by the Antro-
buses to the Supreme Court seeking certiorari on the standard of review question for mandamus
petitions would have been immediately subject to the attack that the entire petition might have be-
come moot. After all, the Antrobuses might have obtained the same relief they were seeking in their
mandamus petition via the vehicle of their parallel appeal. Thus, the Tenth's Circuit's decision
denying consolidation (for reasons entirely unexplained) constituted, as a practical matter, a bar to
the Antrobuses seeking review in the Supreme Court.
74. Antrobus, 563 F.3d at 1097.
75. Id. at 1099.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1100 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK,
2008 WL 53125, at *5 (D. Utah Jan. 3, 2008)).
78. Nate Carlisle, Notes Confirm Suspicions of Trolley Square Victim's Family, SALT LAKE
TRIB., June 25, 2009, available at http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_12380112.
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Newly released FBI documents say that Sulejman Talovic told a
coworker he wanted a gun to commit a bank robbery.
The statement corroborates an argument made by the parents of a
Trolley Square victim Vanessa Quinn. Sue and Ken Antrobus have
said one of the people who sold Talovic a .38-caliber pistol knew Ta-
lovic was going to use it to commit a crime."
7 9
The Justice Department released these documents to the media-
without first providing them to the Antrobuses, whose daughter was
murdered at Trolley Square-and in contravention of its previous repre-
sentations to the Tenth Circuit that it could not release the documents due
to Privacy Act concerns. Conveniently, all of this happened after the
Antrobuses' opportunity to provide the documents to the Tenth Circuit
had evaporated because their appeal had come to an end.
In summary, it is worth briefly highlighting the net result of the An-
trobuses' tortuous journey through the courts. After the district court
denied their motion to have their daughter recognized as a "crime vic-
tim," they were unable to have the merits of that decision reviewed by
the Tenth Circuit, despite four separate attempts. In the first trip, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the holdings of (at least) two other circuit courts to
erect a demanding "clear and indisputable error" standard of review.
Having imposed that barrier, the court then stated that the case was a
"close" one but that they would not grant relief-with one concurring
judge noting that sufficient proof of the Antrobuses' claim might rest in
the Justice Department's files. The Antrobuses then returned to the dis-
trict court, where the Justice Department refused to clarify the district
court's misunderstanding of what information rested in its files. The An-
trobuses then sought mandamus review of the question of discovering
that information in the Justice Department files, which the Department
"mooted" by agreeing to file that information with the district court and
not opposing any release to the Antrobuses. But the district court stymied
the Antrobuses' attempt by refusing to grant their unopposed motion for
release of the documents.
The Antrobuses then sought appellate review of the district court's
initial "victim" ruling, only to have the Tenth Circuit conclude that they
were barred from taking an appeal. The Tenth Circuit, however, said that
they "should" pursue the issue of release of the material in the Justice
Department's files in the district court. So they did-only to lose again in
the district court. And on a final mandamus petition to the Tenth Circuit,
the court ruled (among other things) that the Antrobuses had not been
diligent enough in seeking the release of the information. With their ap-
peals at an end, the Justice Department chose to release discovery infor-
mation about the case-not to the Antrobuses, but to the media.
79. Id.
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The question arises, then, whether Congress intended for those who
have been victimized by federal crimes to face such barriers in attempt-
ing to assert rights under the CVRA. To answer that question it is useful
to examine the background of the Act and Congress's intended purpose.
II. THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT: REFORMING THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TO CONSIDER VICTIMS
A. The Victims' Rights Movement and the Federal System
The CVRA arose from the efforts of the crime victims' movement
to gain broad and enforceable rights in the federal criminal justice proc-
ess.80 The roots of the CVRA can be traced back to the 1982 Report of
the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime. The report concluded:
[T]he criminal justice system has lost an essential balance.... [Tihe
system has deprived the innocent, the honest, and the helpless of its
protection .... The victims of crime have been transformed into a
group oppressively burdened by a system designed to protect them.
This oppression must be redressed.
81
The Task Force advocated multiple reforms, such as a victim's right
to be heard at sentencing. 82 The Task Force also sweepingly proposed a
federal constitutional amendment to protect crime victims' rights "to be
present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings. 83 In
the wake of that recommendation, crime victims' advocates considered
how best to achieve that goal. Realizing the difficulty of achieving the
consensus required to amend the United States Constitution, advocates
decided to go first to the states to enact state victims' rights amendments.
They had considerable success with this "states first" strategy84: to date,
about thirty states have adopted amendments to their own state constitu-
tions,85 which protect a wide range of victims' rights.
80. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victinms in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victimv' Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REV.
835, 852-924 (2005) [hereinafter Cassell, Recognizing Victims]; Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime
Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 861, 863 (2007).
81. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114 (1982), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publicationspresdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf.
82. Id. at 63.
83. Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted).
84. See S. REP. No. 108-191, at 3 (2003).
85. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONsT. art. il, § 2.1;
CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 28; COLO. CONST. art. H, § 16a; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8(b); FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 16(b); IDAHO CONsT. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b); KAN.
CONST. art. XV, § 15; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25; MD. CONST. art. XLVII; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24;
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 32; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28; NEV. CONST. art. 1, §
8; N.J. CONST. art. I, T 22; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37; OHIO CONST. art. 1, §
10a; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 42; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, §
24; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; VA. CONST. art. I,
§ 8-A; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9m.
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The crime victims' rights movement was also able to prod the fed-
eral system to recognize victims' rights. In 1982, Congress passed the
first federal victims' rights legislation, the Victim and Witness Protection
Act, which gave victims the right to make an impact statement at sen-
tencing and provided expanded restitution.86 Since then, Congress has
passed several acts further protecting victims' rights, including the Vic-
tims of Crime Act of 1984,87 the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of
1990,88 the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,89
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,90 and the
Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997.91 Other federal statutes have
been passed to deal with specialized victim situations, such as child vic-
tims and witnesses.92
Among these, the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990
("VRRA") is worth briefly highlighting because its flaws created an im-
petus for Congress to ultimately enact the CVRA. The VRRA purported
to create a comprehensive list of victims' rights in the federal criminal
justice process. The act commanded that "[a] crime victim has the fol-
lowing rights," 93 and then listed various rights in the process. Among
those were the right to "be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim's dignity and privacy,"'
94 to "be notified of court proceedings,"
95
to "confer with [the] attorney for the Government in the case, ' 96 and to
attend court proceedings, even if called as a witness, unless the victim's
testimony "would be materially affected" by hearing other testimony at
trial.9 ' The statute also directed the Justice Department to make its "best
efforts" to ensure that victims received their rights.
98
While the VRRA appeared to promise sweeping rights to crime vic-
tims, it never successfully integrated victims into the federal criminal
justice process and was generally regarded as something of a dead letter.
Along with "standing" problems (discussed below), one likely reason for
the ineffectiveness of the VRRA was that it was curiously codified in
Title 42 of the United States Code-the title dealing with "Public Health
and Welfare." As a result, the statute was generally unknown to federal
86. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248.
87. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
88. Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 502, 104 Stat. 4789,
4820, repealed by Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260.
89. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796.
90. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214.
91. Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-6, 1 It Stat. 12.
92. See, e.g., Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights, 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006).
93. Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 § 502(b).
94. Id. § 502(b)(1).
95. Id. § 502(b)(3).
96. Id. § 502(b)(5).
97. Id. § 502(b)(4).
98. Id. § 502(a).
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judges and criminal law practitioners. Federal practitioners reflexively
consult Title 18 for guidance on criminal law issues. More prosaically,
federal criminal enactments are bound together in a single West publica-
tion-the Federal Criminal Code and Rules. This single publication is
carried to court by prosecutors and defense attorneys and lies on the desk
of most federal judges. Because West Publishing never included the
VRAA in this book, the statute was essentially unknown to even the
most experienced judges and attorneys.
B. The Tenth Circuit's Thwarting of Victim's Rights in the McVeigh
Case
The prime illustration of the ineffectiveness of the VRRA comes
from the Oklahoma City bombing case. Coincidentally, this notorious
example of a court decision denying victim's substantive justice came
from the Tenth Circuit, which denied victims of the bombing any right to
seek appellate review of denials of their claims. Because Congress spe-
cifically singled out the Tenth Circuit's decision in McVeigh as one of
the decisions it specifically intended to overrule with the CVRA, it is
worthwhile to briefly discuss that decision here. 99
McVeigh arose from a pre-trial hearing on a motion to suppress,
during which the district court sua sponte issued a ruling precluding any
victim who wished to provide victim impact testimony at sentencing
from observing any proceeding in the case. Each victim would have to
choose one or the other: watch the trial or be eligible to testify at the sen-
tencing phase. The court based its ruling on Rule 615 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the so-called "rule on witnesses."' ° In the hour that
the court gave to victims to make this wrenching decision about testify-
ing, some of the victims opted to watch the proceedings, while others
decided to return home and remain eligible to provide impact testi-
mony.'
0 '
Thirty-five victims and survivors of the bombing then filed a mo-
tion asserting their own standing to raise their rights under federal law
and, in the alternative, seeking leave to file a brief on the issue as amici
curiae.10 2 The victims noted that the district court apparently overlooked
99. United States v. McVeigh, 157 F.3d 809, 814-15 (10th Cir. 1998). See generally Paul G.
Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 479, 515-22 (1999) (discussing this case in greater detail).
100. Transcript of Suppression Hearing at 4-5, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M
(D. Colo. June 26, 1996) (citing FED. R. EvID. 615).
101. See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 6 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 73 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing] (state-
ment of Marsha A. Kight).
102. See Motion of Marsha and H. Tom Kight [et al.] ... and the National Organization for
Victim Assistance Asserting Standing to Raise Rights Under the Victims' Bill of Rights and Seeking
Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M (D. Colo. Sept.
30, 1996). I represented a number of the victims on this matter on a pro bono basis, along with able
co-counsel of Robert Hoyt, Arnon Siegel, Karan Bhatia, and Reg Brown at the Washington, D.C.,
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the bill of rights contained in the VRRA. The VRRA promised victims
(among other rights) the right "to be present at all public court proceed-
ings ... unless the court determines that testimony by the victim would
be materially affected if the victim heard other testimony at trial.' ' 3
Prompted by the victims' motion, the district court then held a hear-
ing to reconsider the issue of excluding victim witnesses. °4 The court
first denied the victims' motion asserting standing to present their own




After argument by the Justice Department and the defendants, the court
denied the motion for reconsideration. 0 6 It concluded that victims pre-
sent during court proceedings would not be able to separate the "experi-
ence of trial" from "the experience of loss from the conduct in question,"
and, thus, their testimony at a sentencing hearing would be inadmissi-
ble.1
0 7
The victims then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Tenth
Circuit seeking review of the district court's ruling. 0 8 Because the pro-
cedures for victims' appeals were unclear, the victims also filed a parallel
appeal in the Tenth Circuit (the Justice Department likewise sought both
mandamus and appellate review).
Three months later, a panel of the Tenth Circuit rejected, without
oral argument, both the victims' and the United States' claims on juris-
dictional grounds. With respect to the victims' challenges, the court con-
cluded that the victims lacked "standing" under Article III of the Consti-
tution because they had no "legally protected interest" to be present at
the trial, and consequently, had suffered no "injury in fact" from their
exclusion.' 9 In addition, the Tenth Circuit rejected, on jurisdictional
grounds, the appeal and mandamus petition filed by the United States.'10
Efforts by both the victims and the Justice Department to obtain a rehear-
ing were unsuccessful,. 1' even with the support of separate briefs urging
law firm of Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering and Sean Kendall of Boulder, Colorado. For a somewhat
more complete recounting of the victims' issues in the case, see my statement in Hearing, supra note
101, at 106-13 (statement of Paul G. Cassell), and my analysis in Cassell, supra note 98, at 515-22.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4) (2006). The victims also relied on a similar provision found in
the authorization for closed circuit broadcasting on the trial, id. § 10608(a), and on a First Amend-
ment right of access to public court proceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980).
104. See Transcript of Hearing on Motions, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M (D.
Colo. Oct. 4, 1996).
105. Id. at 499-500.
106. Id. at 519.
107. Id. at 517.
108. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir.
1997) (No. 96-1484).
109. McVeigh, 106 F.3d at 334 (per curiam).
110. Id. at 336.
111. Order Entered March 11, 1997, at 2, McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (No. 96-1484) (denying
rehearing).
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rehearing from 49 members of Congress, all six Attorneys General in the
Tenth Circuit, and some of the leading victims groups in the nation." 1
2
C. Victims' Efforts to Pass a Federal Constitutional Amendment
Because of the problems with the statutory protection of victims'
rights, victims' advocates decided in 1995 the time was right to press for
a federal constitutional amendment. They argued that the statutory pro-
tections could not sufficiently guarantee victims' rights. In their view,
such statutes had "frequently fail[ed] to provide meaningful protection
whenever they come into conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional
indifference, [or] sheer inertia."" 3 As the Justice Department reported:
[Elfforts to secure victims' rights through means other than a consti-
tutional amendment have proved less than fully adequate. Victims'
rights advocates have sought reforms at the state level for the past
twenty years, and many states have responded with state statutes and
constitutional provisions that seek to guarantee victims' rights. How-
ever, these efforts have failed to fully safeguard victims' rights.
These significant state efforts simply are not sufficiently consistent,
comprehensive, or authoritative to safeguard victims' rights. 114
To place victims' rights in the Constitution, victims' advocates (led
most prominently by the National Victims Constitutional Amendment
Network' 15) approached President Clinton and Congress about a federal
amendment." 16 On April 22, 1996, Senators Kyl and Feinstein introduced
a federal victims' rights amendment with the backing of President Clin-
ton. 1 7 The intent of the amendment was to "restore, preserve, and pro-
tect, as a matter of right for the victims of violent crimes, the practice of
victim participation in the administration of criminal justice that was the
112. See Hearing, supra note 101, at 106-13 (1997) (statement of Paul G. Cassell); Cassell,
supra note 99, at 518 n.207. In the meantime, the victims, supported by the Oklahoma Attorney
General's Office, sought remedial legislation in Congress clearly stating that victims should not have
to decide between testifying at sentencing and watching the trial. The Victims' Rights Clarification
Act of 1997 was introduced to provide that watching a trial does not constitute grounds for denying
the chance to provide an impact statement. The legislation, however, had an abortive implementa-
tion, as the district court refused to squarely state that it he would be bound by the law and, as a
result, the victims were unable to make clear decisions about whether to watch the trial or to sit out
and preserve their eligibility to be an impact phase witness. Cassell, supra note 99, at 519.
113. Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Op-Ed., Embed the Rights of Victims in the Consti-
tution: A Proposed Amendment Protects Victims, Without Running Roughshod over the Rights that
Are Due the Accused, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B5.
114. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J. Res.
6 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 64 (1997) (statement of Janet Reno, U.S.
Attorney Gen.).
115. See National Victims' Constitutional Amendment Passage, http://www.nvcap.org (last
visited Apr. 16, 2010).
116. For a comprehensive history of victims' efforts to pass a constitutional amendment, see
Jon Kyl, Steven J. Twist & Stephen Higgins, On the Wings of Their Angels, the Scott Campbell,
Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims'Rights Act, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L REV. 581, 583-91 (2005).
117. S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. (1996).
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birthright of every American at the founding of our Nation."" 8 The pro-
posed amendment embodied seven core principles: (1) the right to notice
of proceedings, (2) the right to be present, (3) the right to be heard, (4)
the right to notice of the defendant's release or escape, (5) the right to
restitution, (6) the right to a speedy trial, and (7) the right to reasonable
protection. In a later resolution, an eighth principle was added: stand-
ing.' 19 The proposed amendment, however, never gained the necessary
supermajority support required to move it through Congress.
1 20
Faced with the difficulties of amending the U.S. Constitution, vic-
tims' rights advocates eventually relented. The CVRA resulted from a
decision by the victims' movement to seek a more comprehensive and
enforceable federal statute rather than pursuing the (at that time unattain-
able) dream of a federal constitutional amendment. In April 2004, vic-
tims' advocates met with Senators Kyl and Feinstein to decide whether
to push again for a federal constitutional amendment. Concluding that
the proposed amendment lacked the required supermajority, the advo-
cates decided to press instead for a far-reaching federal statute protecting
victims' rights in the federal criminal justice system. 121 In exchange for
backing down from the constitutional amendment in the short term, vic-
tims' advocates received near universal congressional support for a
"broad and encompassing" statutory victims' bill of rights. 122 This "new
and bolder" approach not only created a bill of rights for victims, but also
provided funding for victims' legal services and created remedies when
victims' rights were violated. 123 The victims' movement would then be
able to see how the statute worked in future years before deciding wheth-
er to continue to push for a federal constitutional amendment.
124
The legislation that ultimately passed-the CVRA-gives victims
"the right to participate in the system." 125 It lists various rights for crime
victims in the process of prosecuting the accused, including the right to
be notified of court hearings, the right to attend those hearings, the right
to be heard at appropriate points in the process, and the right to be treated
with fairness.' 2 6 Rather than relying merely on the "best efforts" of pros-
118. S. REP. No. 108-191, at 1-2 (2003); see also S. REP. No. 106-254 (2000) (listing recom-
mendations for the federal victims' rights amendment).
119. S.J. Res. 65, 104th Cong. (1996).
120. See Cassell, Recognizing Victims, supra note 80, at 856-923 (collecting comprehensive
legislative history).
121. Kyletal.,supranote 116, at 591-92.
122. 150 CONG. REC. S4260-61 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
123. Id. at S4263 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
124. Id. at S4263-66 (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney
Gen., Prepared Remarks at the Hoover Inst. Bd. of Overseers Conference (Feb. 28, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.hoover.org/research/conferences/3022346.html?show=transcript) (indicating
a federal victims' rights amendment remains a priority for President Bush).
125. 150 CONG. REC. S4263 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). For a description of victim partici-
pation, see Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation
Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1999).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2006).
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ecutors to vindicate the rights, the CVRA also contains specific enforce-
ment mechanisms.' 2 7 Most important, the CVRA directly confers stand-
ing onto victims to assert their rights, a flaw in the original VRRA.1
2 8
The Act provides that rights can be "assert[ed]" by the "crime victim or
the crime victim's lawful representative, and the attorney for the Gov-
ernment,"'129 and explicitly provides that the victim (or the government)
may appeal any denial of a victim's right through a writ of mandamus on
an expedited basis.130 Senator Kyl explained that "[w]ithout the right to
seek appellate review and a guarantee that the appellate court will hear
the appeal and order relief, a victim is left to the mercy of the very trial
court that may have erred."
' 131
The CVRA also broadly provides that courts must "ensure that the
crime victim is afforded" the rights given by the new law.' 32 These
changes were intended to make victims "an independent participant in
the proceedings."''33 And the sponsors of the legislation took a shot di-
rectly at the Tenth Circuit, warning courts in the future not to give the
same sort of chary construction of the new victims' rights law:
It is not the intent of this bill that its significance be whittled down or
marginalized by the courts or the executive branch. This legislation is
meant to correct, not continue, the legacy of the poor treatment of
crime victims in the criminal process. This legislation is meant to en-
sure that cases like the McVeigh case [do not recur], where victims of
the Oklahoma City bombing were effectively denied the right to at-
tend the trial[,] and to avoid federal appeals courts from determining,
as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did, that victims had no stand-
ing to seek review of their right to attend the trial under the former
victims' law that this bill replaces.'
34
I1. VICTIMS' APPELLATE RIGHTS UNDER THE CVRA
In light of the history and purpose of the CVRA, we can now con-
sider the Tenth Circuit's ruling in In re Antrobus 35 that crime victims
must prove "clear and indisputable" error in order to obtain any review in
127. Id. § 3771 (c)-(d).
128. Cf Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing, Remedy, and
Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 350-55 (2005) (identifying this as a pervasive flaw in victims'
rights enactments).
129. § 3771(d)(1).
130. Id. § 377 1(d)(3).
131. 150 CONG. REc. S 10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also Kyl et
al., supra note 116, at 619 (finding that CVRA alters general rule that mandamus is a discretionary
remedy).
132. § 3771(b)(1).
133. 150 CONG. REC. S 10,911 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
134. Id.
135. 519 F.3d. 1123 (10th Cir. 2008). Given the tortuous history of the litigation involving the
Antrobuses, for convenience in the remainder of this Article I use the designation "Antrobus deci-
sion" to refer to the Tenth Circuit's first opinion, denying the Antrobuses relief because of the "clear
and indisputable" error standard.
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the appellate courts. Given Congress's plan to "correct, not continue, the
legacy of the poor treatment of crime victims in the criminal process," it
would be rather surprising to find that the CVRA contained such a de-
manding level of proof. In fact, neither the language, structure, nor legis-
lative intent behind the CVRA supports such a conclusion. Instead, Con-
gress intended to give crime victims the same sort of access to the na-
tion's appellate courts as other litigants obtain.
A. The Plain Language of the CVRA Gives Crime Victims Ordinary Ap-
pellate Review
The linchpin of the Antrobus decision is the Tenth Circuit's conclu-
sion that the "plain language" of the CVRA dictates a higher standard of
review than would ordinarily be available on appeal. The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that, in using the term "mandamus" in the CVRA, Congress
intended to impose on victims various limitations that sometimes attach
to mandamus petitions. The court ultimately held that "mandamus is a
'drastic' remedy that is 'to be invoked only in extraordinary situa-
tions, ' '' 136 and therefore, the Antrobuses-and all other crime victims
following after them in the Tenth Circuit-had to show that their right to
the writ was "clear and indisputable."'
' 37
The Circuit's review of the "plain language" of the statute was re-
markably truncated. It focused on the term "mandamus" in the Act,
without carefully reviewing the structure of the statute. The relevant pro-
vision in the CVRA not only provides victims with an opportunity to
seek a writ of mandamus, it also guarantees that the courts of appeals
must take up and decide the application:
Motion for relief and writ of mandamus-The rights described in
subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district court in which a defen-
dant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is under-
way, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.
The district court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a vic-
tim's right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief sought, the
movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus.
The court of appeals may issue the writ on the order of a single judge
pursuant to circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The court of appeals shall take up and decide such application
forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been filed. In no event
shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than
five days for purposes of enforcing this chapter. If the court of ap-
peals denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall be
clearly stated on the record in a written opinion.
138
136. Id. at 1124 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)).
137. Id. at 1126.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (d)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
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Antrobus rested its holding on the single word "mandamus" appear-
ing in this provision, while ignoring the broader setting. Had the court
looked at the word in context, it would have seen that Congress intended
a different sort of appellate regime than that constructed by the Circuit-
one that gives crime victims a right to appellate review even in routine
cases. 139 As the Ninth Circuit stated in Kenna v. United States District
Court for Central District of California:
[T]he CVRA contemplates active review of orders denying victims'
rights claims even in routine cases. The CVRA explicitly gives vic-
tims aggrieved by a district court's order the right to petition for re-
view by writ of mandamus, provides for expedited review of such a
petition, allows a single judge to make a decision thereon, and re-
quires a reasoned decision in case the writ is denied. The CVRA cre-
ates a unique regime that does, in fact, contemplate routine interlocu-
tory review of district court decisions denying rights asserted under
the statute. 
1 40
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in its construction. The Second Cir-
cuit has also held that "[u]nder the plain language of the CVRA. . . Con-
gress has chosen a petition for mandamus as a mechanism by which a
crime victim may appeal a district court's decision denying relief under
the provisions of the CVRA''14 and, therefore, "a petitioner seeking re-
lief pursuant to the mandamus provision set forth in § 3771 (d)(3) need
not overcome the hurdles typically faced by a petitioner seeking review
,, ,42of a district court determination through a writ of mandamus.
One significant hurdle that a petitioner bringing an ordinary writ of
mandamus faces is that review of the petition is a matter of judicial dis-
cretion. 143 By contrast, under the CVRA, the right to appellate review is
non-discretionary. Section 3771(d)(3) provides that "[tihe court of ap-
peals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72 hours
after the petition has been filed." 144 Clearly, Congress put in place for
crime victims something other than traditional mandamus review. As one
leading authority on crime victims' rights recognized in discussing the
CVRA's mandamus provision:
139. For an excellent, if somewhat briefer, exposition of this argument, see Steven Joffee,
Note, Validating Victims: Enforcing Victims' Rights through Mandatory Mandamus, 2009 UTAH L.
REV. 241,249-55 (2009).
140. 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006).
141. In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Rios v. Ziglar, 398 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Once the petitioner has
established the prerequisites of mandamus relief, the court may exercise its discretion to grant the
writ."); In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 979 (11 th Cir. 2003) ("[Ordinarily, the] issuance of a
writ of mandamus lies in large part within the discretion of the court." (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143, 1146 (5th Cir. 1979))).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
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[T]he problem in review of victims' rights is not the unavailability of
writ review, but rather the discretionary nature of writs. The solution
to the review problem is to provide for nondiscretionary review of
victims' rights violations. . . . One could not credibly suggest that
criminal defendants' constitutional rights are to be reviewed only in
the discretion of the court. Crime victims' rights should be similarly
respected. The solution of Congress in [the CVRA] is excellent, pro-
viding for a nondiscretionary writ of mandamus. 145
Because Congress in the CVRA expressly altered conventional le-
gal principles that otherwise might apply to review of a mandamus peti-
tion, the Tenth Circuit's reliance on the rule of statutory construction
involving "borrow[ed] terms of art" 146 was an obvious mistake. Congress
certainly borrowed the term "writ of mandamus" as the tool for crime
victims to obtain quick review of trial court actions. But it plainly sought
to forge that tool into a powerful remedy that would fully protect crime
victims. Moreover, that rule of statutory construction must give way to
the canon of construction requiring remedial legislation to be constructed
"liberally to facilitate and accomplish its purposes and intent."
147
Other provisions of the CVRA also indicate that the statute provides
ordinary appellate review. The CVRA directs that "[i]n any court pro-
ceeding"-presumably including appellate proceedings-"the court shall
ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in [the
CVRA].' 48 The congressional command that appellate courts "ensure"
that crime victims are "afforded" their rights would be fatally compro-
mised if those courts were confined to examining lower court proceed-
ings for clear and indisputable errors. Indeed, if the Antrobus litigation
shows anything, it is that the Tenth Circuit never ensured that the Antro-
buses were provided the rights the CVRA promised them. In rejecting
their initial mandamus petition, the Tenth Circuit described the issue of
whether the district court had clearly and indisputably erred as a "diffi-
cult" one' 49-strongly suggesting that the court would have ruled in the
Antrobuses' favor had the "crime victim" issue been squarely before it
without deferential review. In addition, Judge Tymkovich concurred
(without disagreement from the majority) to decry the Justice Depart-
ment's lack of cooperation with the Antrobuses, noting that the evidence
to prove the Antrobuses' case "may well be contained in the govern-
ment's files. Sadly, the Antrobuses were not allowed a reasonable oppor-
tunity to make a better case."'' 50 But it is one thing to describe a family's
145. Beloof, supra note 128, at 347.
146. In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008).
147. Elliott Indus. Ltd. P'ship v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 407 F.3d 1091, 1118 (10th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Stratton v. Gurley Motor Co., 737 P.2d
1180, 1185 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)).
148. § 3771 (b)(1) (emphasis added).
149. Antrobus, 519 F.3d at 1125.
150. Id. at 1127 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
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plight in the courts as a sad one and entirely another thing to do some-
thing about it-in other words, to use appellate court power to ensure
crime victims a reasonable opportunity to vindicate their rights. By hid-
ing behind a heightened standard of review, the Tenth Circuit shirked its
own legal obligation to "ensure" that the Antrobuses' legal rights were
"afforded" to them.
This same provision in the CVRA also requires that "[t]he reasons
for any decision denying relief under this chapter shall be clearly stated
on the record.' 15' The basis for this provision, as one of the legislation's
sponsors stated in the legislative history, is that "requiring a court to pro-
vide the reasons for denial of relief is necessary for effective appeal of
such denial."' 52 If Congress had envisioned mere cursory review for clear
and indisputable errors, it would have had no reason to add this provi-
sion.
The CVRA also broadly commands that crime victims must "be
treated with fairness" throughout the criminal justice process. 53 Victims
are not treated fairly if, as one of the sponsors of the CVRA noted, they
are "left to the mercy of the very trial court that may have erred."'
' 54
Leaving crime victims without meaningful appellate review deprives
victims of the promised right to be treated with fairness.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's review of the Antrobuses' petition
under traditional mandamus standards leads to an absurd result. Section
3771(d)(4) of the CVRA provides that "[iun any appeal in a criminal
case, the Government may assert as error the district court's denial of
any crime victim's right in the proceeding to which the appeal re-
lates.' 55 This provision gives the government the right (if the defendant
appeals) to take a cross-appeal of an alleged error by the trial court-a
cross-appeal that would presumably receive ordinary appellate review. 156
But this means, under the Antrobus holding, that the Government can
obtain more thorough appellate review of a denial of a victim's right than
the victim, or her representatives, could obtain on mandamus review.
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit's holding would also penalize a crime
victim for (as in the Antrobus case) exercising her right to independent
legal counsel rather than having the government assert an error.'
57
151. § 3771(b)(I).
152. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added).
153. § 3771 (a)(8).
154. 150CONG. REC. S10,912 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
155. § 3771 (d)(4) (emphasis added).
156. See id. The Justice Department appears to have undercut the effectiveness of this provi-
sion by declining to take even a single cross-appeal (as far as I am aware) under this provision in the
more than five years since the CVRA's enactment.
157. See § 3771 (c)(2).
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Finally, the Antrobus opinion violates a cardinal rule of statutory
construction that a statute's provision should not be interpreted so as to
be "meaningless, redundant, or superfluous."' 58 Antrobus interpreted the
language "the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of
mandamus" to mean only that the movant may petition for an ordinary
writ of mandamus. But before Congress enacted the CVRA, a crime vic-
tim could (like anyone else) petition for a writ of mandamus under the
All Writs Act. 59 Thus, under the Circuit's interpretation, the CVRA
mandamus provision is superfluous.
When the Antrobuses raised this superfluity point in their petition
for rehearing, the Tenth Circuit briefly responded by arguing that it was
interpreting the CVRA's appellate review provision to give victims
"considerably more rights than they would otherwise have."' 6 But the
only new right that the Circuit listed was a right for "putative crime vic-
tims [to] receive a decision from the court of appeals within 72 hours."',
61
This right to a decision within 72 hours is spelled out in a separate sen-
tence from the right to file a mandamus petition,' 62 meaning that the
Tenth Circuit (at a minimum) rendered the sentence giving victims the
right to file a mandamus petition entirely superfluous. Moreover, the
Tenth Circuit never gave any explanation for the language that appears in
the same sentence as the 72-hour-decision requirement-that the "court
of appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith."'' 63 This
language can only be read as altering the discretionary nature of manda-
mus review-something that the Tenth Circuit avoided by simply ignor-
ing the language entirely.
For all of these reasons, under the plain language of the CVRA, or-
dinary appellate review applies to crime victims' petitions.
B. Congress Clearly Intended Ordinary Appellate Review for Crime Vic-
tims Under the CVRA
Not only does the plain language of the CVRA clearly demonstrate
that ordinary appellate review applies to crime victims' petitions under
the CVRA, but the legislative history leaves no doubt whatsoever that
Congress intended this result. Indeed, one of the most remarkable things
about the Antrobus decision is that the Tenth Circuit seems to have de-
liberately ignored the legislative history-not discussing (or even citing)
the specific statements made by the legislation's sponsors.
158. Andersen v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 455 F.3d 1102, 1106 (10th Cir.
2006).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). For an example of a victim's mandamus petition, see Petition
for Writ of Mandamus, United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1484).
160. In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1129 (10th Cir. 2008) (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
161. Id.
162. See § 377 1(d)(3).
163. Id.
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Like other circuits and the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit has
historically looked to legislative history to resolve ambiguities in a stat-
ute." Although the Tenth Circuit did not explain why it declined to re-
view the legislative history of the CVRA in Antrobus (history that had
been specifically proffered by the Antrobuses' 65), presumably, the reason
was that the Tenth Circuit found no ambiguity in the plain language of
the CVRA. But when the Antrobuses filed their petition with the Tenth
Circuit, three other circuits had already addressed the question of the
standard of review-and all three had unanimously reached the opposite
conclusion of the Tenth Circuit.' 66 While it is surely possible that all
three circuits were wrong, it is hard to believe that they had all misread a
statute that unambiguously directed the opposite conclusion. 1
67
The reason the Tenth Circuit needed to blind itself to the legislative
history is that even a quick peek would have left absolutely no doubt that
Congress intended to give crime victims the same appellate protections
that other litigants receive. One of the CVRA's two co-sponsors (Senator
Kyl), for example, specifically described the CVRA as encouraging ap-
pellate courts to "broadly defend" victims' rights and as providing a right
to an "appeal":
[W]hile mandamus is generally discretionary, this provision [18
U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3)] means that courts must review these cases. Ap-
pellate review of denials of victims' rights is just as important as the
initial assertion of a victim's right. This provision ensures review and
encourages courts to broadly defend the victims' rights.
Without the right to seek appellate review and a guarantee that the
appellate court will hear the appeal and order relief, a victim is left to
the mercy of the very trial court that may have erred. This country's
164. See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 410 (2002) (looking to legislative
history to resolve ambiguity); Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 2006) (same).
165. See Petition for Panel Rehearing with Suggestion of Rehearing en Banc at 2, Antrobus,
519 F.3d 1123 (No. 08-4002).
166. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th Cir.
2006); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 561-63 (2d Cir. 2005); see also In re
Walsh, 229 F. App'x. 58, 60 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing and following the Second and Ninth Circuit
decisions, and holding that the CVRA makes "mandamus relief.., available under a different, and
less demanding, standard" than the ordinary mandamus petitioner would have to meet). Since the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Antrobus, two other circuits have weighed in on the standard of review
issue. The Eleventh Circuit followed the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits in reviewing a crime
victims' petition under conventional appellate standards. In re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11 th
Cir. 2008). On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit, without explanation of its own, simply followed the
Tenth Circuit's Antrobus decision. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391,393-94 (5th Cir. 2008).
167. The legal commentators on the statute also read it to provide regular appellate review. See
20A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 321.14 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp.
2009) ("[B]ecause Congress has chosen mandamus as the mechanism for review under the CVRA,
the victim need not make the usual threshold showing of extraordinary circumstances to obtain
mandamus relief."); Beloof, supra note 128, at 347.
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appellate courts are designed to remedy errors of lower courts and
this provision requires them to do so for victim's rights. 1
68
Likewise, the other co-sponsor (Senator Feinstein) said the manda-
mus provision "provides that [the appellate] court shall take the writ and
shall order the relief necessary to protect the crime victim's right,"'69
leading Senator Kyl to agree that crime victims must "be able to have
denials of those rights reviewed at the appellate level, and to have the
appellate courts take the appeal and order relief."'
' 70
In Antrobus, the Tenth Circuit described the term "mandamus" as a
"borrow[ed] term[] of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition
and means of centuries of practice." But as explained by Senator Fein-
stein, the CVRA was designed "to be a new use of a very old procedure,
the writ of mandamus. This provision will establish a procedure where a
crime victim can, in essence, immediately appeal a denial of their rights
by a trial court to the court of appeals .... ,,17
It is well settled that statements made by the sponsors of congres-
sional legislation "deserve[] to be accorded substantial weight in inter-
preting the statute." 172 These remarks make clear that Congress would
have wanted the Antrobuses' petition reviewed under ordinary appellate
standards. It is impossible for appellate courts to "broadly defend" vic-
tims' rights and "remedy errors of lower courts" under the CVRA if they
are confined to granting mandamus petitions only where the right to ob-
tain the writ is "clear and indisputable." A crime victim is not allowed to
"immediately appeal a denial of his rights" if all he can obtain in the ap-
pellate courts is deferential review for clear and indisputable errors.
Congress's clear undeniable goal was to give crime victims the same
appellate protections other litigants receive.
While ignoring this clearly expressed congressional intent, the
Tenth Circuit inferred a contrary congressional intent by reasoning that
"Congress could have drafted the CVRA to provide for 'immediate ap-
pellate review' or 'interlocutory appellate review,' something it has done
many times."' 173 On this point, the court was simply mistaken: Congress
has not used those phrases "many times." In fact, neither the Westlaw
nor Lexis federal statutory databases contain even a single use of either
168. 150 CONG. REC. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added); see also Kyl et al., supra, note 116, at 619 (noting that the CVRA alters the general rule that
mandamus is a discretionary remedy).
169. 150 CONG. REC. S4270 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (emphasis
added).
170. Id. (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis added).
171. Id. S4262 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (emphasis added).
172. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976); accord Kenna v.
U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2006) (giving substantial
weight to remarks of Senators Feinstein and Kyl to interpret the CVRA).
173. In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1124 (1Oth Cir. 2008).
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one of those phrases. The reason the phrase "immediate appellate re-
view" (for example) does not appear is easy to discern: the phrase is
something of an oxymoron. Detailed provisions in the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure require appeals to proceed by way of notice in the
district court followed by preparation of transcripts, designation of a re-
cord, and a specific briefing schedule that runs at least 70 days. Writs of
mandamus are burdened by none of these requirements. In light of the
existing appellate rules, Congress could not guarantee "immediate appel-
late review" of crime victims' petitions without overhauling the rules to
eliminate delay. Indeed, in the isolated statutes allowing interlocutory
government appeals in criminal cases, Congress has usually required the
appropriate United States Attorney to personally "certif[y] to the district
court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay."' 7 4 This certifica-
tion requirement reveals Congress's understanding that appeals risk de-
lay, rather than provide prompt review.
When the Antrobuses pointed out in their petition for rehearing that
the Tenth Circuit was flatly wrong in stating that Congress had used the
phrases "immediate appellate review" and "interlocutory appellate re-
view" "many times," the court responded, but not by acknowledging that
its earlier statement was wrong. Instead, in its amplified opinion denying
rehearing, the court simply switched phrases without admitting its earlier
mistake, noting "[a]nd, although it is only a rough measure, a computer-
aided search of the United States Code indicates that the phrase 'inter-
locutory appeal' appears 62 times, and the word 'interlocutory' appears
123 times in the same sentence as the word 'appeal."",175 This new, care-
fully-hedged claim does not address the Antrobuses' point that an imme-
diate interlocutory appeal would be quite difficult to structure under the
appellate rules. Instead, the court proved (at most) that an interlocutory
appeal would be possible in some circumstances.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit used the curious locution that the
phrase "appears" in a "search" of the U.S. Code because it could not
assert that Congress had provided for an interlocutory appeal 123 times
or even 62 times. In fact, most of the times the phrase appears in the
search is because the statutory database has some description of an al-
ready-existing interlocutory process or secondary commentary-rather
than the actual creation of such a process.
176
174. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2518(10)(b) (allowing govern-
ment appeal of motion to suppress under wiretap act only where U.S. Attorney certifies the "appeal
is not taken for purposes of delay"); cf id. 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 7 (allowing government to take an
interlocutory appeal of order releasing classified information).
175. Antrobus, 519 F.3d at 1129 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
176. See, e.g., David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, 9 U.S.C.A. § 16 (West 2010) (discuss-
ing public policies surrounding "interlocutory appeals"); 1sT CIR. BANKR. APP. PANEL R. 8003-1
(providing bankruptcy rules for "interlocutory appeal"); Federal Reserve System Hearing Rules, 12
C.F.R. § 263.17 (2009) (Federal Reserve rules on interlocutory appeals).
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The Tenth Circuit was correct in stating that Congress has provided
for an "interlocutory appeal" in a few circumstances, most notably in
cases involving evidentiary rulings against the government in criminal
cases. 177 But Congress presumably eschewed granting crime victims a
potentially open-ended right to an "appeal" in the CVRA because the
courts might have construed it as making crime victims actual parties to
criminal prosecutions. Allowing a victim to take an "appeal" suggests
that victims could attack anything in a criminal trial or judgment not to
their liking. Although the CVRA does provide crime victims the right to
"re-open a plea or sentence,"' 178 the right to re-open was designed to per-
mit courts to remedy a violation of a victim's rights, not to allow victims
to broadly challenge anything and everything not to their liking in the
outcome of criminal prosecutions. Thus, it is not surprising that Congress
would have chosen a different word than "appeal" to describe the appel-
late right given to crime victims, while at the same time taking steps to
ensure that the appellate right was every bit as effective as conventional
appellate rights. The Tenth Circuit failed to fairly evaluate Congress's
intent in adopting the CVRA.
C. Mandamus Petitions in Other Contexts Receive More Generous Re-
view When Important Rights Are at Stake
One last point is worth brief discussion. Mandamus petitions are a
common vehicle for third-parties whose rights are affected in the crimi-
nal process to seek review of an issue affecting them. In these other con-
texts, third parties receive the functional equivalent of an appeal even
though they proceed by way of mandamus. 1
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Perhaps the best example of mandamus petitions providing the
functional equivalent of an appeal comes from news media mandamus
petitions challenging court closure orders in criminal proceedings. Like
crime victims' petitions under the CVRA, such petitions involve attempts
by non-parties to assert important rights in an underlying criminal action.
Yet courts of appeals have not typically subjected these petitions to
"clear and indisputable" review, as this would leave First Amendment
freedoms subject to the vagaries of trial court judges. 180 For example, in
the Fourth Circuit, to obtain relief from courtroom closure orders, news
organizations are required to seek a writ of mandamus, rather than being
177. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(f)(5) (2006) (providing for government appeals of rulings
regarding disclosure of classified information at trials).
178. Id. § 3771(d)(5).
179. See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2001). See gener-
ally Steven Wisotsky, Extraordinary Writs: "Appeal" by Other Means, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC.
577, 588-89 (2003).
180. See 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT El AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3936.3
(2d ed. 1969 & Supp. 2009) (discussing writ review of media claims and concluding that "regular
[appellate] review [of such claims] is justified by the profound interests ... in public access to in-
formation about judicial proceedings").
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permitted to file an appeal, and such closure orders are then reviewed de
novo.1
8 1
The Tenth Circuit also requires the news media to proceed by way
of writ of mandamus to assert First Amendment rights in ongoing crimi-
nal proceedings.' 82 While the standard the Circuit employs to review
such petitions is not completely clear, it typically reaches the underlying
legal merits of a news media claim on mandamus review.' 83 Even in the
one instance where the Tenth Circuit applied the "clear and indisputable"
standard in news media claims, it did so only after reaching the merits of
the petitioner's claim. In Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem,' 84 the Tenth
Circuit granted the writ "[b]ecause Judge Mechem's order was imper-
missibly overbroad," and therefore, "Journal Publishing has a clear and
indisputable right to an order of mandamus reversing the decree."', 85 Of
course, the only way the court could find that the order was "impermissi-
bly overbroad" was for it to first reach the claim's legal merits. This is
consistent with conventional mandamus practices, where appellate courts
reach the underlying claim in deciding whether "clear and indisputable"
error occurred below.' 86 In Antrobus, however, the Tenth Circuit by-
passed this entire process by never actually deciding whether Vanessa
Quinn was a "victim" under the CVRA.
CONCLUSION
As Congress has recognized, "without the ability to enforce the
rights in the ... appellate courts of this country any rights afforded [to
crime victims] are, at best, rhetoric." 87 The Antrobuses' journey through
the courts sadly confirms this point. Although the district court's conclu-
sion that the Antrobuses' daughter was not a "crime victim" rested on
shaky foundations, the Antrobuses were unable to secure full review of
181. See In re Charlotte Observer (Div. of Knight Publ'g Co.), 882 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir.
1989) ("[W]e consider it technically appropriate to review the orders at issue pursuant to our power
under the All-Writ Act .... [O]ur review is essentially a de novo consideration of the constitutional-
ity of the magistrate's directly operative closure order .... "); see also In re Providence Journal Co.,
293 F.3d 1, 9, 11 (1st Cir. 2002) (dismissing appeal papers, then proceeding to review on writ the
district court decision "under the First Amendment's heightened standard of review").
182. United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1250 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1998).
183. See, e.g., id. at 1254 ("[This case] requires an analysis of whether the documents are
subject to the [Albuquerque Journal's] First Amendment and common law rights of access, and
whether the district court clearly violated a legal duty in its assessment of how those rights apply to
the documents." (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 810-11 (10th Cir. 1997))); McVeigh, 119 F.3d at 812 (considering
whether "the district court orders satisfy the First Amendment standard"); Combined Commc'ns
Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818, 821 (10th Cir. 1982) (reaching merits of television station's man-
damus petition without imposing a higher standard of review).
184. 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986).
185. Id. at 1237.
186. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 832 n.10 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The 'clear
and indisputable' test is applied after the statute has been construed by the court entertaining the
petition." (emphasis added)).
187. 150 CONG. REc. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added).
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that decision despite making four separate trips to the Tenth Circuit. In-
stead, the Circuit would only tell the Antrobuses that, proceeding under
the standard of clear and indisputable error, they had presented a "close
case" and it was (as one concurring judge put it) "sad" that the district
court and the Justice Department had not given them the full opportunity
to make their case by revealing the facts of the case. These expressions
of concern, of course, did nothing to vindicate the Antrobuses' rights. To
the Antrobuses, their promised right to make a victim impact statement
on behalf of their murdered daughter was mere rhetoric.
Congress did not intend for victims to be treated so unfairly. To the
contrary, Congress's clear intent in enacting the CVRA was to provide
effective and enforceable rights for crime victims through the criminal
justice system-including the nation's appellate court system. Hopefully,
in a future case, the Tenth Circuit en banc will reverse its unfortunate
decision in Antrobus and provide crime victims with the appellate protec-
tions that Congress intended for them to have. If the Tenth Circuit will
not act on its own, the final word on this subject should come from the
Supreme Court. With a clear circuit split now existing on this important
issue, Supreme Court review is necessary and appropriate. When that
review comes, the Court should read the CVRA as Congress clearly in-
tended and ensure that crime victims' rights receive the same appellate
protections that all other litigants receive.
2010O]

